• We consider realistic network topologies, based on preferential attachments.
Introduction
One of the major research directions in adaptive and self-organizing systems is dedicated to learning how to coordinate decisions and actions of multiple agents. Also, it is important to understand whether individual agents' decisions can lead to globally optimal or at least acceptable solutions. Our long term research aims at studying the effect of several types of strategies for self-organization of agents in complex systems. The present paper addresses simulation of agents' decisionmaking regarding a well-known problem in collectives in general [1] and in minority games in particular.
We use two distinct scenarios. The first is the El Farol Bar Problem (EFBP), proposed by B. Arthur [2] , which has also been the subject of, e.g., Refs. [3, 4] . The idea behind this metaphor is that a common situation people face is when one has gone to his/her favorite pub only to find out that it happened to be overcrowded that night, leading to one regretting not to have stayed home.
The metaphor of rewarding the decision that is made by the minority of the players (or agents) is interesting in many scenarios. For instance, in agent-based simulation of traffic, a minority game is clearly useful to model route choice. This leads us to the second scenario, which deals exactly with iterated route choice (IRC) in vehicular traffic networks.
Minority games have been the focus of many works. Regarding the general idea, the most similar works to the present paper have appeared in Ref. [5] and in Ref. [6] . In all these cases, the authors have also considered agents in a kind of social network. However, the connectivity was such that the average number of neighbors with whom each agent interacts was fixed. In the present paper we use a topology with preferential attachment in the sense of Barabási and Albert [7] , which basically means that a few nodes have big connectivity while the majority of the nodes are connected to just another node. Also, we go beyond classical minority games such as the EFBP -where the reward is binary -and propose that the use of the RBN formalism can model a wider class of games. Here we discuss the two applications previously mentioned.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next two sections review some works on the EFBP and its more general version, the minority game (Section 2), and explain how the RBN formalism works (Section 3). Following these, in Section 4 our methods are presented. Simulation results and their analysis then follow. Finally, Section 6 discusses several aspects of this work and its future directions, and provides concluding remarks.
Related work on minority games, and route choice
Microeconomics and game-theory assume human behavior to be rational and deductive-deriving a conclusion by perfect logical processes from well-defined premises. But this assumption does not hold especially in interactive situations like the coordination of many agents. There is no a priori best strategy since the outcome of a game depends on other players. Therefore, bounded and inductive rationality (i.e., making a decision based on past experience) is supposed to be a more realistic description.
In this context, in 1994, B. Arthur introduced a coordination game called the El Farol Bar Problem. Every week n players wish to visit the bar El Farol. Up to a certain threshold ρ of customers the bar is very comfortable and enjoyable. If it is too crowed, it is better to stay home. The payoff of the game is clear: if the number of visitors is less than the threshold ρ, these visitors are rewarded, otherwise those who stayed home are better off. In the original work, n = 100 and ρ = 60 were used, but arbitrary values of n and ρ have also been studied, as e.g., in Ref. [4] .
The players can only make predictions about the attendance for the next time based on the results of the previous m weeks. For the decision whether to go or to stay home, the player always selects the strategy that predicts the outcome of the last weeks most accurately. Computer simulations have shown that the mean attendance converges to the threshold ρ = 60.
Later, the EFBP was generalized to a binary game by Challet and Zhang [3] , the so-called Minority Game (MG). An odd number n of players has to choose between two alternatives (e.g., yes or no, or simply 0 or 1). With a memory size m there are 2 2 m possible strategies. Each player has a set S of them. These are chosen randomly out of the whole set. In the simplest version of the game, players are rewarded one point if they are in the minority group. Other functions that favor, for instance, smaller minorities were studied by several authors as, e.g., Refs. [8, 4] .
The MG and the EFBP are gradually becoming a paradigm for complex systems and have been recently studied in detail. We will refer briefly to some of the results.
In their original work, Challet and Zhang [3] have systematically studied the influence of the memory size m and number of strategies S on the performance of the game. B. Edmonds [9] has investigated the emergence of heterogeneity among agents in a simulation. His paper tackles evolutionary learning as well as communication among agents, which might lead to a differentiation of roles at the end of the run.
Still regarding the EFBP, the most similar work to the present paper has appeared in Ref. [5] . However, the focus there is resource allocation: agents using particular resources are rewarded or punished according to the availability of these resources. Also, agents use a set of strategies to decide which resource to choose, and use a simple reinforcement learning scheme to update the accuracy of strategies. A strategy is a lookup table that suggests to an agent what resource to choose based on the actions of its neighbors at the previous time step. This way, these authors have also considered agents in a kind of social network. However the connectivity is such that the average number of neighbors with whom each agent interacts is fixed. In the present paper we use a topology with preferential attachment [7] , which basically means that a few nodes have big connectivity while the majority of the nodes are connected to just another node.
In more general terms, there has been an interesting line of research connecting minority games and collective intelligence such as Ref. [10] . For a discussion see Ref. [1] . 
Regarding the use of the minority game in urban traffic, some publications suggest the application of this metaphor in modeling processes such as route and mode choice. This is particularly relevant in environments where the decision is coupled with other agents' decisions, as it is the case of route choice. In this modeling approach it is usual to consider abstract scenarios such as a binary route choice, inspired by congestion or minority games. The basic idea is that agents have to decide simultaneously between two routes; those that select the less crowded one receive a higher reward. Agents' repeated decision-making is coupled to some adaptation or learning strategy so that the next choice is adapted to the reward feedback. Based on this, an equilibrium may be reached.
Examples of such abstract two-route scenarios can be found in Ref. [11] , in which a reinforcement learning scheme is used that aims at reproducing the decision-making of human subjects in a corresponding experimental study [12] . Before this, a similar scenario had appeared in Refs. [13, 14] , where a second phase in decision-making is included after agents receive a forecast of travel time. In these game-theoretic scenarios, the reward of agents selecting a route is calculated based on the total number of agents that selected that route. In these three works, the problem is so formulated that the equilibrium is reached when two-thirds of the drivers select one route.
Finally, authors in Ref. [15] investigate the use of minority games to achieve a balanced usage of a road network in which decisions are made about which link to follow.
Random Boolean networks
Boolean networks have been used to explain self-organization and adaptation in complex systems. The study of the behavior of regulatory systems by means of networks of Boolean functions was introduced by Kauffman in 1969 [16] . Examples of the use of this approach in biology, genomics, and other complex systems can be found in Ref. [17] .
RBN's are made up of binary variables. In the settings investigated here, a network is composed of N agents that must decide which binary action to make. Each agent is represented by one of these binary variables. These in turn are, each, regulated by some other variables, which serve as inputs. The dynamical behavior of each agent, namely which action it will execute at the next time step, is governed by a logical rule based on a Boolean function. These functions specify, for each possible combination of K input values, the status of the regulated variable. Thus, being K the number of input variables regulating a given agent, since each of these inputs can be either on or off (1 or 0), the number of combinations of states of the K inputs is 2 K . For each of these combinations, a specific Boolean function must output either 1 or 0, thus the total number of Boolean functions over K inputs is 2 2 K . When K = 2, some of these functions are well-known (AND, OR, XOR, NAND, etc.) but in general there is no obvious semantics.
To illustrate the regulation process, Fig. 1 depicts a simple example of a network of N = 3 agents where each was assigned a Boolean function randomly, and K = 2. The Boolean functions for these 3 agents are then depicted in Table 1 (adapted from Ref. [17] ): agents A and B are regulated by function OR, while agent C is regulated by an AND. In this table, one can see all possibilities for C (3rd column) to make a decision. Similarly, A's output is determined by the inputs from both B and C , and B's output depends on inputs from A and C .
Given the three Boolean function from Tables 1 and 2 shows, for all 2 3 states at a given time T , the action taken by each agent at time T + 1, i.e., the successor state of each state. Further, from this table, it is possible to determine the state transition graph of the network, which appears in Fig. 2 . One sees that there are 3 state cycles. Table 2 States' transition for Table 1 .
Table 3
Mutated version of Table 1 .
States' transition graph for Table 1 (3 state cycles and attractors). If we randomly assign one of the 2 2 K Boolean functions to each of the N agents, the dynamics is deterministic and the system ends up in one of the state cycles. It is then a matter of chance that only a certain number ρ of agents end up in the minority. For instance in the case depicted in Fig. 2 , in both cycles 1 (000) and 3 (111), either none (state 1) or all (state 3) select a given action. However, if the network depicted in Fig. 1 suffers some perturbation or mutation (as part of some evolutionary process), then the system may escape a bad attractor (which, in the context of minority games, is a state in which either too many or too few agents make a given action). This evolution of the network may happen in several ways: agents get reconnected to others, the Boolean functions change, etc..
Let us consider an example in which the Boolean function of agent C changes from AND to NAND. Functions are now depicted in Table 3 while Table 4 shows the successor state of each state and Fig. 3 depicts the state transition graph. The dynamics of the regulation changes as seen in Fig. 3 . Now only one state or attractor exists (110), namely one that has the property that agents A and B are always in the majority while agent C is in the minority.
The extent of such a change -whether or not the system will be attracted to another attraction basin -obviously depends on the extent of the changes in the network and/or functions. In [17] the author extensively discusses many of these factors, as well as the properties of RBN's, including the issue of stability and cycle length. In the present paper, because the logic of the functions and the structure of the network changes along time, properties such as periodic behavior cannot be observed. Table 4 States' transition for Table 3 .
On the other hand, a central question raised by Kauffman, and which is relevant to our work, relates to the problem of adaptation in a system with many interacting parts. The key question is whether an adaptive process which is constrained to altering the input connections between elements in a network and the logic governing them can hill climb to networks with desired attractors.
Methods
As mentioned, in the present paper we use RBN's to equip the agents with a decision-making framework. This is appropriate for binary (i.e., Boolean) decision-making, which aim at considering inputs from other agents in this decisionmaking process. To do so, in the EFBP for instance, we replace the space of possible strategies described in Ref. [2] by a set (one per node) of Boolean functions. This also means that each node is connected to a given number of others. Hence, instead of having a random strategy, each node has random Boolean functions and uses them to determinate whether or not to go to the bar. Contrarily to the work in Ref. [2] (and many others that have followed), we consider that the agents are organized in a kind of social network.
Similarly, in the route choice (IRC) scenario, instead of using a probabilistic approach to select a route (as in Ref. [13] ), each driver agent explores a set of functions and a set of connections to other agents in order to make the route decision.
We now describe the details of the approach, whose scheme appears in Algorithm 1. Each agent i ∈ N is a node in a random Boolean network and is connected to a given number of others. Contrarily to previous works, this number is not fixed and/or homogeneous. Therefore K (number of acquaintances and consequently the number of entries in the Boolean functions) is not a parameter that has a constant value as in other approaches. Rather each node may have its own K i .
The topology of this social network is set according to a preferential attachment algorithm. We have used both the algorithm proposed in Ref. [7] , as well as a slight modification on it, which is intended to prevent degrees related to K being too high. Results shown later in Section 5 refer to the latter but we also discuss what happens if the standard algorithm is used. The reason for preventing the increase in K is that it is clear that when K is high, the RBN behaves in essence randomly given that the space of possible outputs is 2 2 K . We remark that when the word degree may refer here to both the number of incoming links to a node, as well as the number of outgoing links from a node. This is especially important in the case we describe later, when the outgoing degrees will be allowed to change as nodes decide to break some connections and replace them for others. Thus when we use K we mean incoming degree, i.e., the number of input links to a node.
Another parameter of the model is the number of functions each node possesses, |F |. We remark that |F | cannot be as large as 2 2 K when K is much larger than 2. This is so because the agent being bounded rational, it can only know a small fraction of the possible functions. Of course, at each time step only one of these functions is used thus the node needs to have a mechanism to decide which one brings more utility at local level. However, given the nature of minority games, the utility is highly coupled with the efficiency at system level. Efficiency is a domain-dependent concept related to the equilibrium of the particular system. In the EFBP the equilibrium calls for the bar accommodating ρ agents (in the original work ρ = 60%). In the IRC, the equilibrium is such that route M carries ρ = 2 3 of the traffic (as in Ref. [12] ). Of course, one cannot be sure that a function that works well for an agent i = 1 will also work well for another agent i = 2. That is because the outcome of a function depends on its inputs (in this case, the agent's acquaintances).
Our approach for adaptation of the functions that are used at local level is based on an ε-greedy exploration process. At time step t = 0 one function from the set of |F i | possible functions is assigned to each agent i. Then, at each further time step, the node decides to change the current function with probability ϕ. Because ϕ < 1, it is not the case that agents change functions synchronously. When a change in function occurs, a new one is selected based on the utility it has provided so far. With probability 1 − ε, the node chooses the function that has yielded the highest reward so far. Otherwise it picks a function randomly. In the beginning of the simulation ε = 1 to allow exploration, but every time a function is changed, the value of ε is multiplied by δ < 1. The rewards are domain-dependent so we defer this discussion for a while.
At each time step each agent uses a function f i ∈ F . According to it and also to the value of the K i entries, either 0 or 1 is output. It must be noticed that the inputs are the actions of the K neighbors in the last time step (in the initial time step, all agents start with a random action). In the EFBP scenario we assume that if a Boolean function returns 0, this means the for all i ∈ N do 11: decide which Boolean action to make based on f i and the K i entries from G i 12:
end for 13: collect all action selections 14: for all i ∈ N do 15: update reward r f i of function f i (domain dependent; see equations Eq. (2) increment t 27: end while agent stays at home; when the function returns 1 the decision is to go to the bar. In the route choice scenario 0 and 1 mean the agent selects route M or its alternative respectively.
So far we have introduced the basic procedures, where each node has fixed connections, i.e., the set of K i acquaintances does not change with time. Next, a variant called change worst (CW) is described.
The CW variant assumes that the network of acquaintances will change over time. CW is more utilitarian than the basic variant, but also more realistic, in the sense that now agents evaluate the quality of their acquaintances. In the real-world, if someone is not performing well in the game, it will be likely to be labeled a black sheep and will be less and less considered as a part of a group. This assumes a certain level of communication among the agents, which is perfectly reasonable given that it is restricted to the small group of acquaintances. Thus, in this variant, each agent i looks at the reward r j of each agent j ∈ G i and finds the agent with the worst reward. Reward here means accumulated reward. Let j − be this agent. Agent i then marks j − as a candidate for replacement, meaning that if i finds a better friend, it will no longer consider the action of j − when deciding its own action. This check is performed simultaneously with the change of function, mainly to avoid having another parameter in the model. Again, the motivation for modeling that kind of behavior is that j − is prematurely labeled as a black sheep and hence prone to be unconsidered, even if j − 's bad reward may not be directly related to i's performance. To replace j − , i will look for a better connection among the best friends (again, in terms of reward) of its friends. The idea here is that i wants to be connected with a person with a good performance. Let j + be this agent. j + 's determination is based on the rewards of the friends of i's friends. More specifically, this means that i asks all its friends about the reward of their friends. Knowing these rewards, i compares the performance of j + in relation to j − and, if the former is higher, i replaces the connection it had to j − by a connection to j + . Again, this does not affect j + since the relationship is not bidirectional; i may find j + is worth considering in its input set without j + even noticing this. After eventually including j + to its social network, i will consider j + as an input in its RBN (in the place of j − ) and hence the input degree K i of i remains the same. j − however becomes less popular while j + increases its popularity and influence.
Reward computation in the EFBP
In the EFBP scenario, the decision of each agent is considered the right one if it decides to go to the bar and less than ρ% of all agents have made the same decision. Similarly, the decision is also considered correct if the agent has decided to stay home and ρ% or more of all agents have decided to go to the bar. The decision is considered wrong otherwise. This is shown in Eq. (1) for each i when using function f i .
This way, at each time step the quality of f i will be measured and its reward r f i will be updated. Also, the accumulated reward of function f i is updated each time it is used, and computed as R f i =  t r f i i.e., it considers only the rewards obtained when a given function f i was used.
(1)
Iterated route choice: description and reward computation
Basically, the abstract scenario used in Refs. [14, 11] (and that we also use here) can be seen as an special instance of the minority game: N agents repeatedly have to decide between two alternative routes M and S. Let us assume that one alternative, namely M (main) is preferred (e.g., it provides more capacity). After each route choice, every agent gets a reward that is computed based on the number of agents who selected the same alternative. This mimics the actual travel time experienced by the agent itself.
In this simple model of adaptive choice, the reward computation for each agent i at time t and using f i is computed as in Eq. (2). The parameters n M and n S represent the number of agents selecting M and S respectively. B is a balancing factor to prevent negative rewards; thus it changes with N. This formula was used in Ref. [12] for studying the decision making process in route decision experiments with N = 18 human subjects. In this case, the balance is achieved by setting B to 30. In the equilibrium, 2N 3 = 12 drivers should select M and 6 should select S, with both getting the reward of 10 units. In Ref. [14] this was extended to a simulated experiment considering N = 900; B = 2100 was used so that the reward of the balanced situation is 1300 units, which is the outcome of Eq. (2) when n M = 600 and n S = 300.
Similarly to the EFBP scenario, R f i is the reward agent i has accumulated (up to step t) when using f i .
Experiments and analysis of the results

Settings
The parameters previously mentioned in Section 4 take the following values. The horizon of simulation is t max = 1000 time steps. The simulations were repeated 30 times for each configuration. N = 900 in both scenarios as we have kept the number of agents from the previous experimental setting of Ref. [14] . The number of Boolean functions known by each agent is at most |F | = 10. We have tested the following values for ϕ and δ: ϕ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.9} and δ ∈ {0.999, 0.99, 0.9}. These values for δ were chosen because they allow us to study those cases when ε decreases at different rates. This of course has an effect on how often agents explore different Boolean functions before exploiting.
In the case of the EFBP the main metric to be analyzed is the amount of agents that go to the bar (as in Ref. [2] ). The objective is to verify whether the use of RBN's in the EFBP also leads to an emerging behavior and, if so, what is the outcome.
We thus compare our results with the ones from Ref. [2] . To do so we use ρ = 60%.
In the IRC, for N = 900 agents, the reward function is balanced in a way that an equilibrium for the distribution of reward occurs when 600 agents select M and 300 S. Thus, in this case, B = 2100.
In the CW variant, we have also performed microscopic analysis about how the topology of the network changes. We do this aiming at understanding the role of degree in the reward of the agents, as well as the degree distribution in the efficiency of the whole system. These results appear in Section 5.3.
As mentioned, one important feature of the present work is the fact that agents are arranged in a more realistic network, generated by means of a preferential attachment algorithm. Fig. 4 shows the distribution of input degree (K ), i.e., how many nodes (y axis) have which K (x axis). This particular plot refers to the EFBP but we notice that the IRC has a very similar pattern. We stress that this distribution does not change with time because even when agents are allowed to change their acquaintances (CW variant), they simply exchange them, thus keeping K i constant.
Results: macroscopic analysis
Before discussing the results, we remark that if Boolean functions are assigned randomly to the agents and do not change along time, it is expected that 50% of the agents select one of the two available actions, i.e., in the EFBP 50% go to the bar, and in the IRC 50% select route M. This is of course not efficient in either case because, in the EFBP the target threshold is ρ = 60% of the agents going to the bar. Similarly, in the IRC, the maximum efficiency of the system is reached when two-thirds of the agents use route M. We start discussing the case in which the topology is set at the beginning of the simulation and does not change (FR variant) in Section 5.2.1. As shown next, in both the EFBP and the IRC the system efficiency is reached (the time taken depends on values of the parameters, especially ϕ). However this is not realistic as people do change their connections because although the system as a whole performs good, some individuals do not. Following this discussion, we then present the results obtained when the topology does change (Section 5.2.2, variant CW).
FR: topology remains fixed
As we can see in Fig. 5 , convergence of the system to average attendance of ρ = 60% is achieved. The time taken for this convergence of course strongly depends on the values of ϕ (the probability of changing function) and δ (how fast ε decreases). When δ decreases fast, the convergence is achieved earlier. Due to lack of space we do not show plots for different values of δ but remark that, among the values tested, δ = 0.9 seems the best value because the agents do not need to have longer experimentation periods (as would be the case with δ = 0.999). The reason for this fast convergence is that the majority of the agents have low K (see Fig. 4 ) and hence not so many functions to try.
The role of the parameter ϕ is more significant; different values of ϕ have different effects in both the EFBP and the IRC scenarios. Fig. 5 shows the bar's attendance for δ = 0.9 and different values of ϕ. As we can see the attendance converges very fast to ρ = 60% when ϕ = 0.9.
Regarding the IRC scenario (Fig. 6) , we note a similar pattern of convergence of the system as a whole to the equilibrium (two-thirds of the drivers selecting route M). However, compared to the EFBP, the convergence is much faster if a lower value of ϕ is used. The reason for this difference is that the reward function in the IRC is more complex meaning the agent needs to probe each Boolean function for a longer time. Therefore, changing functions too frequently (which is what happens when ϕ is above 0.1) is not a good policy.
CW: topology changes along time
We now discuss what happens in a more realistic situation, namely the agents exchange their worst performing acquaintance for some good performing one, selected among the friends of its friends. Fig. 7 shows such a plot, here for the EFBP (IRC is similar), for δ = 0.9, for changing values of ϕ. We remark that ϕ is also used to do the exchange of acquaintances.
Comparing Fig. 5 with Fig. 7 it is possible to see that the convergence to ρ = 60% for ϕ = 0.9 now takes more time, due to the fact that not only functions change in the CW case but also the connections. It thus remains to be investigated what happens if only acquaintances are changed, keeping functions constant or, alternatively, if functions change at a slower pace.
Results: microscopic analysis
The results presented in the previous sections are interesting as they confirm the convergence to the system equilibrium, which is obtained by the agents adapting at individual level. However they say close to nothing about individual performances or at least about the performance of classes of agents. We now discuss what happens with agents that have different levels of influence (i.e., outgoing degree) as well as different rewards. Since such kind of analysis cannot be done over an average of several repetitions (because the degree of a node varies greatly as it is randomly assigned at the beginning of the simulation), the discussion refers to two arbitrarily chosen simulation run (one for each scenario).
We start with the EFBP considering one simulation with δ = 0.9 and ϕ = 0.9. In this simulation, the most influenced node, i.e., the one that has the maximum incoming degree has K i = 13. This however is not the main aspect of our investigation since the highest K does not change along time. Thus we concentrate the discussion on the outgoing degree, i.e., how some nodes influence others, as well as on some network centrality measures. Tables 5 and 6 refer to the EFBP and IRC respectively. They show, for the initial time steps as well as for the last one, the following information: name of the node (2nd column); its outgoing and K i degrees (3rd and 4th columns); which outgoing degree this node had in the previous time step (to permit an evaluation of how this changes, 6th column); how many clusters there are, and the size of the biggest cluster. A cluster is a graph component such that its nodes are connected to other nodes within the same component, i.e., these nodes share no edge with nodes outside the cluster.
In the EFBP (Table 5) , at the beginning of the simulation, node 6 is the most influential node, influencing 12 others. Note that node 6 has K i = 9. This node then remains with outgoing degree 12 in step 2. However the most influential node in step 2 is now node 35 (influencing 15 others). As time passes, one notes the increase in outgoing degrees, caused by the fact that many nodes want to be attached to good performing ones. It is no coincidence that the K of the most influential node (in each time step) decreases. Nodes with high K have a lot of lines in their Boolean tables (2 K ) and are therefore, ''complex'' nodes. If K is higher than 3 or 4, the behavior can be considered basically random, at least in the time frame considered.
At step 10 of the simulation, node 184 has turned very popular. It influences 66 other nodes (in the previous step, not shown in the table, it influenced just 39). We do not include the centrality measures in the table but notice that we have investigated closeness and betweenness for each node at each time step. For instance, node 184 has, at step 10, the highest closeness (value 0.00120192). This value is the average hops required to reach all other nodes from node 184. From this step on the connections do not change much so that at step 1000, the most influential node is 872 (degree 68, closeness 0.001201923).
It is also interesting to check what happens with the number of clusters in the graph, as well as their sizes. This depends mainly based on two factors. The first is the random nature of the initial connecting process, i.e., how initial connections are established between the nodes. Thus, this factor determines the initial number of clusters. The second relates to the parameter ϕ, since this parameter determines how frequently a change of Boolean function happens and ultimately, how good a node performs, which then determines how many connections it has. Thus ϕ determines how fast cluster sizes change. As a general rule, the higher the ϕ, the faster some nodes may find a good Boolean function, which improves their performance and attracts other nodes, forming more clusters.
We show here two examples. The first (shown in Table 5 ) refers to a situation with initially many clusters and ϕ = 0.9. For the results given in Table 6 , it can be seen that there is only one cluster containing all nodes; there, ϕ = 0.1.
Regarding Table 5 , the random process at the beginning of this particular simulation run has generated 14 clusters. The biggest cluster included 374 of the 900 nodes. As time proceeds, there is a tendency of some nodes finding a good Boolean function, thus attracting other nodes. Also, some nodes break with their bad input connections, increasing the number of clusters, as bad performing nodes get more and more disconnected. The only thing they can do is to change their worst acquaintance as well. Table 6 shows a similar evolution of the size of the outgoing degree, this time, as mentioned, for a random selected run of the IRC case with δ = 0.9 and ϕ = 0.1. Here, because the convergence to the stable situation takes longer than for the EFBP, we do not show step by step but rather only steps in which either the most influential node has changed or, if not changed, had its value changed greatly. As mentioned, in the beginning, there is just a single cluster that includes all nodes. As in the EFBP, as time passes, we note an increase in the number of clusters and a decrease in the size of the biggest cluster.
Regarding the outgoing degree, at the beginning of the simulation, node 816 influences 12 others. At time step 5 it is the node 159 which turns the most influential, although node 816 returns to this position at step 6, even increasing its influence to 13 at step 7. From this on, other nodes turn more influential so that, e.g., by step 70 node 266 influences 79 other nodes. The situation stabilizes and by the end of the simulation, node 760 influences 79 other nodes.
The conclusion of the microscopic analysis is that more influential nodes tend to be simple (low K ), probably because they are more foreseeable, thus making the adaptation to them (by the neighbors) easier.
Conclusion and future work
Minority games have been used as metaphors to study adaptation of agents that have to act in a coordinated way in collectives. Depending on the setting, agents have a different way of using a set of individual strategies to select an action. These strategies are normally based on the complete knowledge about the attendance at the previous m weeks. Instead of assuming this knowledge, in the present paper we assume that agents interact in a social network. In particular, differently from previous works, the connectivity degree K is not homogeneous. Rather, agents are connected based on preferential attachment. We then let each agent i decide which action to do based on a Boolean function that maps the inputs of K i acquaintances to i's output. Our approach admits some variants that were tested, as for instance whether or not to exchange acquaintances.
We have applied these ideas in two scenarios that differ greatly in the way the reward function is structured. We have found that using the RBN formalism (instead of memory-based methods), each agent is able to select an action that brings the system to the equilibrium, thus achieving the implicit coordination already observed by other authors.
Moreover, we are able to study microscopic properties such as how the influences change within time. The main finding is that more influential nodes tend to be simpler, i.e., have few inputs only.
In a future work we want to focus on the microscopic analysis regarding the rewards obtained, in the same way that we have analyzed the evolution of the influences in the network. We also plan to make more detailed analysis by different classes of values of K and also investigate the effect of changing the number of Boolean functions each agent knows, as for instance having this number change according to K .
